Sunday, April 12, 2009

Kosovo and Europe

Political Role of the European Union towards Kosovo
By Arben Llapashtica

KIJAC

Introduction

Depending at which side of the coin one looks, the Kosovo question showed both the ineffectiveness and effectiveness of the European Union’s Foreign Policy. This was not something stemming from an act, but rather as a result of almost half a decade long bad policies towards the dissolution of Yu. Since Kosovo issue was also left out of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the European Union’s Foreign Policy suffered a blow during the war in Bosnia in particular and in general out of the break-up of Yugoslavia issue, it was only the European Parliament that continuously reacted through declarations and hearings regarding the situation in Kosovo.
In 1998 European Union Foreign Ministers agreed to impose sanctions on Serbia and appointed a mediator in order to resolve the issues of Kosovo[1], thus it stands to reason that the European Union was trying, albeit using ‘soft’ political and economical instruments, to influence the situation in Kosovo. Unfortunately the reality created in the ground changed dramatically with the escalation of the conflict dooming the initiative of the EU to failure.
Since 1999, the European Union has strived for more proactive policies towards the region. By the second War of the 90’s in Kosovo in 1999, the EU has altered its role based on the lessons learned and attempts that history would not be repeated, to that of senior partner in the civilian aspects of military effort[2].
The development of the security and military policies and instruments went hand in hand with the development of the civilian role and policies of the European Union itself. What was considered to be the “failure” of the EU to respond hastily in Kosovo led the British and French governments take a joint initiative to extend the CFSP to security and defence[3].
All things taken in to account the revisions within the European Union had a positive impact on the general approach of the European Union towards the Western Balkans.
With the aid of several incentives “tools” such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and Stabilization and Association Process the European Union made it clear to the countries of the region that new “game” rules were in place to which everybody would have to abide by.
The United Nations adopted the Security Council Resolution 1244, by which the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo was formed. The Security Council Resolution 1244 gave the mandate to build a Civilian Administration in Kosovo led by the United Nations, under which its people could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy[4]. In order to function more effectively, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) devised a four pillar structure. Pillar IV or the economic reconstruction pillar, is led by the European Union Mission in Kosovo. European Union Mission in Kosovo together with the European Agency for Reconstruction in Kosovo is headed by the European Commission, and thus gives the European Union a particular role in the international arena. Regardless of how establishment of pillars went, the role and impact of the European Union in post war Kosovo is multi dimensional, undisputed and certainly involves elements of state building.


Involvements of European Union in Kosovo

Since 1999 when the European Union was actively engaged in the region and Kosovo, the priorities of the European Union presence in Kosovo have changed. The main policy instruments used by the European Union in post-war Kosovo were the humanitarian/aid instruments that were performed through the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office, which was active in Kosovo from 1999 until 2003, the so called “emergency phase” and had spent €112M[5].

Later, the European Agency for Reconstruction for Kosovo was formed, and until now has financed projects ranging from infrastructure rehabilitation, health, education, good governance, capacity building, civil society etc, and above all European Union also contributed directly to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget in order to help Kosovar Government establish sound and effective administration[6]. Since 1999 the European Community aid to Kosovo amounts to over € 1.6 Billion[7]. The main financial instrument in funding the above projects was the CARDS programme implemented by the European Agency for Reconstruction, while the direct contribution to the Consolidated Budget of Kosovo was done under the financial assistance from EU.

Later on the European Union moved to economic/reconstruction projects followed by leading the privatization process and, in accordance with the United Nations Resolution 1244, transfer of powers to Kosovar authorities. In its presence in Kosovo from 1999, the European Union had numerous achievements, such as:

· the creation of a modern market economy through the introduction of commercial and economic legislation conforming to European Standards;
· the launch of the privatisation process stimulating economic development and investment; the successful changeover to the euro as the single currency;
· the creation of a working banking system with nine commercial banks including over 240 branches;
· the initiation of free trade agreements and integration of Kosovo into various regional and European economic structures;
· the transformation of the customs service into a modern organisation collecting over 70% of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (KCB) funds; the introduction of various measures to counter economic crime and corruption; and
· the stabilisation of Kosovo's fragile energy situation’[8]

In the reality created after the declaration of Independence on the 17th of February, and the transition period foreseen in the Ahtisaari agreement the process of transfer of powers from ‘international community’ to Kosovar authorities is almost completed while the European Union will still oversee the achievements of the above mentioned institutions.
During the first years after the Kosovo War, European Union Foreign Policy was mainly directed by the European Commission, because two major actors, European Pillar IV and European Agency for Reconstruction were supervised by it.

Even though the European Union, through its main presences in Kosovo acted as a multi-dimensional actor, i.e. humanitarian aid/economic support/state building, the ‘Brussels Machinery’, also acted as in a monitoring capacity in regards to implementation of democratic principles during this state building project.

With regard to Kosovo being part of the Stabilization and Association process as the main framework policy of the European Union towards the region states, two main events shaped the European Union’s influence in Kosovo. Firstly, the United Nations endorsed ‘Standards for Kosovo’ easily interpreted as another form of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ and secondly the 2004 European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by United Nations Security Resolution 1244.

‘Standards for Kosovo’ reinforce Kosovo’s progress towards European standards in the framework of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process, based on the Copenhagen criteria[9], albeit with a soft hand approach which was designed to “feed” meat to the stabilization and association process.

The EU power was shown in several occasion ensuring that state-building continues in a gradual and “non-forced” manner. To ensure this the EU had several key positions through which they were able to guide the processes. The role of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, a best illustrative one to this regard, was very important in shaping the policies of the Kosovar Government. In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Kosovar Parliament in February 2003, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, writes and requests from the Parliament not to proceed with a resolution that declares independence of Kosovo, since basic pre-conditions such as creation of authentic democratic institutions, are not fulfilled, and that it will not have an effect in resolution 1244[10]. Once again, same as for the ‘Belgrade Agreement’ the High Representative for CFSP uses political pressure in order to achieve the Common Foreign and Security Objectives, and thus support the main claim of the thesis that European Union is an international actor and that its policies towards Western Balkans are changing permanently the environment.

The second main event and/or approach of the European Union towards Kosovo are the European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

The European Partnership towards Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security Resolution 1244 defines the tasks which UNMIK and Provisional Institutions of Self Government have to implement. These tasks are grouped under short termed priorities and key priorities and other political, economical requirements, obligations, policies etc. The main Short Term Priority underlined by the European Partnership is the persuasion for implementation of Kosovo Standards as endorsed by the United Nations, in order to ensure a secure, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo

Once again the European Union through European Partnership, sets forward the tasks and priorities that, in this case UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) in Kosovo have to implement in order to benefit from the Stabilization and Association Process, as a general framework of the European Union’s approach towards Western Balkans.

In order to oversee the implementation of the priorities, the European Union in cooperation with UNMIK and PISG developed the Stabilization and Association Tracking Mechanism, as a tool to monitor implementation of the priorities lay out by the European Partnership. Though the Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism, regular meetings were organized in order to assess progress made by UNMIK and PISG in political, economic and institutional reforms, particularly in compliance with the conditionality of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process’[11].

Later on during 2005, even through running one of the Pillars of UNMIK, the European Union through EU Commission showed even greater commitment towards Kosovo. Through a Communication by the European Commission called ‘European Future for Kosovo’, the European Union supported the achievements made in Kosovo and committed itself in a better engagement in Kosovo, by helping Kosovo towards its European aspirations, on the condition that the Kosovar leaders demonstrate commitment for European values[12].

Commitments by European Union in Kosovo are multiple, but since the overall objective is achievement of political goals, i.e. stable and democratic society, it easily supports the claim of the thesis, by which EU is an international actor, even though a ‘sui generis’ one, and by application of its tools and instruments it is causing a permanent change in the society of Kosovo.
Nevertheless, Kosovo was part of the whole Balkan Project, and as noted by Batt, ‘The EU’s commitment to the Balkans thus implies more than a merely ‘foreign policy’ interests in Kosovo question; it is a commitment to partnership with the countries of the region in the shared goal of transforming them into a set of functioning democracies that are capable of becoming future EU member states’[13]

2008 brings a whole new chapter, in regards to relations between the European Union and Kosovo. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence, and thus showed a bit of discrepancy of the European Union as a whole towards Kosovo, especially because not all of the European Union member states have recognized Kosovo. Independence of Kosovo also opened a new form of relations between Kosovo and European Union, in relation to implementations of the Ahtisaari Proposal, where EU has a great role, and especially in establishing the EULEX.
On the other hand, the support for EU actors in Kosovo shows a discrepancy. Albanians are quite sceptic of the advantages such a presence might have, due to their disagreeable experience with the UN Mission in Kosovo. The Serbs, on the other hand seem to be determined in boycotting all that is linked to an independent Kosovo. One might argue that these missions have not been welcomed by the entire population; One could argue that the deployment itself is a positive sign that paves the way for a more rapid acceptance than anticipated.

Conclusion

Kosovo has made it abundantly clear that it shares aspirations with the countries of the Western Balkans to embrace the values of the EU and eventually become a member of the European family (EU).
The fact that Kosovo was seen and treated as a separate entity throughout after 99, empowers the leadership of Kosovo to fully embrace European values and push hard for changes that are needed in Kosovo journey forward.
The leadership of Kosovo has shown that it is not under the illusions that there will be no obstacles on our way, albeit regardless of the difficulties, government officials in every chance or public appearance have shown public commitment to European Integration. European integration also bulks the political programs of Kosovos political parties closing the circle and ensuring that the commitments towards the EU are not political posturing.

Kosovo needs to meet criteria to be considered a serious candidate for EU. Kosovo has committed itself to the European Partnership Agreement, which in its turn was enriched with the Standards for Kosovo. With the declaration of independence, Kosovo has also taken up the responsibility to attentively implement the Comprehensive Status Settlement Proposal compiled by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. The EPA and Ahtisaari Proposal complement one and other and encompass a great deal of the reforms Kosovo has to undergo to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

It is of utmost importance that the EU doesn’t yield down from its commitment to integrating Kosovo, as well as the western Balkans, in its midst. Such signals would ensure that the stability of Kosovo is eroded and could lead to further destabilisation of the region as well.

At the same time the EU, faces quite some challenges itself which they need to clear out in a hasty manner. Kosovo seems to have certainly put to the test EU’s unity with the Union not being able to take a common stand on the unilaterally declared independence.

At the end, we could easily argue, similarly as high level politicians do, that ‘Kosovo is sui generis’, one could easily say that road of Kosovo towards EU, and EU’s mission in Kosovo is also ‘sui generis’.
[1] BBC News Service (1998), ‘EU launches Kosovo Initiative’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/65482.stm [accessed September 2008]
[2] Smith, Hazel (2002), ‘European Union Foreign Policy – What it is and what it does’ Pluto Press, London pp. 254
[3] Bache, Ian, and George, Stephen (2006) ‘Politics in the European Union’ Oxford University Pres, Oxford, UK, pp. 533
[4] United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ‘About UNMIK’, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm [accessed September 2008]
[5] European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, ‘How is EU represented’ http://www.delprn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_kosovo/echo.htm [accessed September 2008]
[6] EU-Commission, ‘Press Release – Kosovo One Year on the European Contribution’, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/00/12&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [accessed September 2008]
[7] EU in Kosovo, ‘What is EU Pillar’ http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php [accessed September 2008]
[8] EU in Kosovo, ‘What is EU Pillar’ http://www.euinkosovo.org/uk/about/about_pillar.php [accessed September 2008]
[9] United Nations Mission in Kosovo, ‘Standards for Kosovo’ http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/more_info.htm [accessed September 2008]
[10] United Nations Mission in Kosovo –Division of Public Monitoring, ‘Local Media Monitoring – 08 February 2003’ http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/mon/feb/lmm080203.htm#1 [accessed September 2008]
[11] European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, ’Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism’ http://www.delprn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_kosovo/stm.htm [accessed September 2008]
[12] European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo, ‘A European Future for Kosovo’ http://www.delprn.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_kosovo/COM_2005_156.pdf [accessed September 2008]
[13] Batt, Judy (2005) ‘The Question of Serbia’ Chaillot Paper n.81, EU-Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai81.pdf [accessed September 2008]

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